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This  paper  investigates  the  interrelationship  between  states  and  families.  At  different  levels  of 
organization, both play a large role in shaping the context in which individuals live their lives. Yet 
when it comes to understanding key demographic events in the ancient Mediterranean world – birth, 
marriage, migration, family structures, and death – they are hardly brought together. In this paper, I 
argue that Greek and Roman demographic patterns were tightly connected with their own specific 
political-institutional frameworks that developed over the course of (city-)state formation processes.  
This interaction was shaped in particular by the emergence of diverging notions of citizenship in the 
Greek and the Roman world, which went hand in hand with the installment of disparate incentives 
and disincentives to certain demographic behaviors. Differing citizenship criteria, in other words, 
invoked different demographic behaviors. A ‘political demography’ perspective, therefore, helps us 
understand  how  and  why  Greek  and  Roman  individuals  selected  their  marriage  candidates  on 




1. Introduction and structure 
 
Cicero - Roman author, political theorist, and lawyer - once argued in one of his court speeches that 
murder of an infant had bereft ‘the father of his hopes, his name of continuity, his family of its 
support, his house of an heir, and the Republic of a citizen-to-be’.
1 A king of rhetorics, he certainly 
played with sentiments, invoking a perception of both private and public loss in order to appeal to 
his jury audience. But regardless of its specific setting, his enumeration illustrates how individuals 
in the Roman Republic were perceived not only as members of a family, but also as members of a 
larger  entity  that  superseded  kinship:  The  State.  Individuals  were  embedded  in  both  of  these 
‘networks’  or  structures,  and  their  position  in  them  networks  affected  their  opportunities  and 
contributed to shaping their behavior. When looking at demographic behavior in the Greek and 
Roman world, organizational infrastructures of states deserve consideration, in particular because 
the classical Greek poleis and the Roman Empire could hardly differ more in this respect. 
  This  paper  focuses  specifically  on  two  elements  of  demography:  marriage  patterns  and 
kinship ties (not kin residence). It aims to understand divergences in both of these by looking at the 
role of one particular element in their political systems: the way in which citizenship notions were 
developed. The argument is structured in such a vein that it first addresses the ancient evidence on 
patterns of marriage and family ties in Rome and in the Greek world – with a particular focus on 
classical Athens. In section 4 through 6, Greece and Rome’s divergent state developments and 
opposed notions of citizenship are set out. Section 7 addresses the implications of these divergent 
notions in daily life: What did it mean to be a citizen, or a foreigner, in the ancient world? In section 
8, we shall see how divergent citizenship notions help explain divergent marriage patterns and 
family ties between Greece and Rome. Directionality of causation is discussed in section 9, and the 
last section, section 10, provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
 
2. Marriage patterns in the Greco-Roman world 
 
                                                
1 Cicero, Pro Cluentio XI.32.   2 
Ancient historians have put much effort in laying out bare facts on marriage ages in the ancient 
world. They have been able to do so with greater success for the Roman than for the Greek world, 
but nevertheless it seems that there were, in fact, no appreciable differences between societies.
2 As 
far as we can tell, in both societies women married young - in their (late) teens - with men who 
were considerably older at around age thirty. Much less attention has been given to another aspect 
of  marriage  patterns:  That  of  the  selection  of  marriage  partners.  Partners  in  marriage  can  be 
characterized along several criteria, but among them there are two of particular interest - namely 
juridic status and kin status. On both criteria, Athenian and Roman customs were distinctive. I will 
first address the selection of marriage partners with regard to civic status, and continue with kin 
relatedness of marriage partners.  
In Athens, civic endogamy was encouraged. We see such a habit of endogamy reflected in 
our evidence which shows how Athenians married with other Athenian citizens, and often with 
members of their own deme (a sub-unit within city-states).
3 Over the course of time, marriage with 
a non-Athenian in fact came to be outlawed. Marrying an outsider could have severe consequences: 
The non-citizen would be sold into slavery, and his or her citizen spouse had to pay a fine which 
amounted to the equivalent of 3 to 4 year salaries of an unskilled worker (1,000 dr.). The father of 
the Athenian bride or groom who had married his child to a foreigner was held responsible for the 
act
4 and  lost his citizenship rights as  a consequence, and was moreover deprived  of all of  his 
property.
5 With these high penalties, exogamous marriage put a sword of Damocles not only above 
the head of Athenian citizens who preferred an outsider, but also above that of their fathers and 
spouses. Transmitted Athenian lawsuits inform us that the prohibition on intercultural marriage was 
not a pro forma empty shell, but actually enforced.  
The predictable unpopularity of mixed marriage is confirmed by the inscriptional record. 
Outside of Athens, the well-known treaty of sympoliteia between Latmos and Pidasa testifies of the 
existence of an endogamy norm: in an attempt at social engineering, it forces both Latmians and 
Pidasians to abandon their normal endogamic practices for a period of six years in order to create 
unity between the merged communities.
6 Clearly, the assumption here is that on their own account, 
people would not be inclined to intermarry.  For Athens, a  survey of inscriptional  evidence  by 
Davies found a stunningly low number of three identifiable cases of intermarriage attested before 
the  2
nd century  BCE.
7  In  the  late  Hellenistic and  Roman  periods  things  started  to  change,  but 
nevertheless the rate of intermarriage seems to have remained low respective to the potential rate. 
Among a body of 2,500 inscriptions relating to Milesian immigrants – free non-citizens - in Athens, 
only a mere 5% were married to Athenians.
8 By all means, marriage between an Athenian born 
citizen and an ‘outsider’ seems to have been a rarity.  
In Rome, such a phenomenon was unheard of. Intercultural or ‘mixed-status’ marriage was 
not outlawed. Marriage between individuals of different legal status is evidenced by inscriptions. 
                                                
2 Note that, on comparative grounds, there do are good reasons to suspect that marriage ages might have differed 
between urban and rural areas. This, however, cannot be proven. For an up-to-date and concise overview of marriage 
ages in the Roman world, see Scheidel (in press). The study of Greek marriage ages is hindered by the fact that 
including ages on gravestones was not very popular in the Greek world. On Greek marriage patterns, see Gallant 
(1991), p. 17-19 and Lefkowitz and Fant (2005
3) [sources]. Note that Hajnal (1965), p. 120-122 is superseded by these 
with regard to Greek and Roman marriages, and by Bagnal and Frier (2006
2) with regard to Roman Egypt. 
3 A deme may be described as a ‘district’ or ‘borough’ of a city or country region, but it was not a truly geographic unit 
because membership of a deme was inherited. Members of one deme could, therefore, have residence in another. Only 
male citizens could be full members of a deme. 
4 I.e. of exposing the citizen body to the risk of potential ‘pollution’ with foreign blood.  
5 E.g. Lefkowitz and Fant (2005
3), p. 79; Scafuro (1994), p. 163. 
6 On this inscription, see e.g. Van Bremen (2003), p. 313-315. It learns us that Latmian men had to swear an oath stating 
that they ‘will share citizenship with Pidasians’. 
7 Davies (1977/1978), p. 111. Unfortunately, Davies gives no further specifications: His study seems to cover the IG 
inscriptions,  which  implies  that  it  includes  a  large  body  of  inscriptions,  but  the  overall  number  of  inscriptions 
investigated remains unknown.   
8 Vestergaard (2000), p. 102-103.    3 
They teach us that it was not uncommon for former slaves to marry freeborn people.
9 In particular 
when these slaves had been members of the households of influential and rich upper-class Romans, 
or  of  the  Imperial  households,  they  were  regarded  as  respectable  marriage  candidates:  An 
impressive 42% of former slaves were married to women who were of free birth.
10  
  With regard to the blood-relatedness of marriage partners, attitudes also differed. This is 
best reflected in the different concerns emphasized in legal texts on kin-marriage. Roman law puts 
the spotlights on marriage between cousins: Until the third century BCE customary law prescribed 
that cognates and agnates to the third degree should not marry each other.
11 Greek law, by contrast, 
was more concerned with defining the conditions under which non-kin marriage should be barred. It 
prescribed that a woman who was the sole ‘heir’ of her father (a so-called epikleros) should marry 
the closest possible of her father’s relatives to keep his property in the family. In these cases, kin 
endogamy was officially imposed, but the phenomenon was seemingly not limited to such cases. In 
oratory speeches Isaios and Isokrates rely on the acceptability of the argument that one should 
marry his daughter to a kinsman – regardless of whether or not she is an epikleros.
12  
Moreover, only about 7.7% of young adult women (at age 25) would be at risk of becoming 
an epikleros when their father died, for lack of a living brother or mother.
13 But it is estimated that 
up to one fifth, or perhaps even one third, of Athenians married with another member of their deme-
group
14, of which there were 139 in classical Athens. It is true that demes were geographical units, 
and therefore this is a form of local endogamy, and not necessarily also of kin endogamy. But at the 
same time, deme membership was hereditary
15, so that over time these geographical units grew to 
be artificial geographical units, and were based more and more on kinship ties, especially as people 
continued to marry at significant rates with members of their deme group. This was all the more so 
because of the fact that demes were small units: In the fifth century, Athens had perhaps about 
30,000 to 40,000 adult male citizens
16, so that each of the 139 demes on average included some 200 
to 300 adult men. If they each headed a family, and the offspring of one in every five of these 
families married within the community, this meant that out of 200 or 300 initial families, 40 to 60 
families would be tied together by blood already in the next generation, even if all families had 
started out as unrelated and were just accidentally living in the same neighborhood. Even judging 
by  the  broader  deme-criterion,  which  is  the  best  we  can  do  in  the  case  of  Greek  inscriptions, 
endogamy with kin was therefore relatively widespread. An illustrative but extreme example of 
intra-deme as well as close kin marriage is provided by the family of Meidon of Myrrhinous. The 
inscriptions for eighteen of the members of this family reveal that two brothers married two sisters 
from a family within the deme, and one of the children born out of these marriages was married to 
her  cousin.
17  These  and  other  examples  demonstrate  how  marriage  functioned  as  a  tactic  to 
                                                
9 References to inscriptions recently identified as referring to such marriages can be found in Gordon and Reynolds 
(2003), p. 273. 
10 Weaver (1986), p. 156.  
11 Evans Grubbs (2002), p. 136f. and Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 108.   
12 Isaios 7.11f and Isokrates 19.46. Cf. Osborne (1985), p. 136. 
13 The estimate of ca. 8% is based on Saller’s 1994 kinship simulation, p. 49, table 3.1.b on proportions of women at a 
certain age having living kin. For women age 25, we reach the highest level of 7.8% on the hypothesis that 44% had no 
brothers. Of these women, 47% had no mother either. Of this subgroup, 37% did still have a living father. Thus, 
(44*0.47)*0.37= 7.7% could potentially become an epikleros. Repeating the same procedure for women aged 20, 30 
and 35, we get to 5.8%, 6.6% and 4.9% respectively.  
14 One fifth at maximum: Vérilhac and Vial (1998), p. 86f. 30% of citizens living in Athens: Cox (1998), Ch. 2. Their 
estimates are based on Athenian inscriptions on which the deme names of both marriage partners are mentioned. Most 
of these inscriptions stem from the 4
th century BCE: cf. Osborne (1985), p. 130f., who also refers to literary evidence on 
close-kin marriage in Athens.  
15 On demes in Athens and hereditary membership: see e.g. Ostwald (1988), p. 312. 
16 Hansen (1985) provides the most extensive analysis.  
17 Osborne (1985), p. 133.   4 
consolidate the kin's group resources and connections.
18 In other words, marriage within the deme 
was a way to create or reinforce ties between extended family members. 
A direct comparison with Rome along the same criteria is not possible: there are no similar 
hereditary indications of ‘local origin’ in Roman names, and even if there were it would be hard to 
make the comparison without knowing the approximate number of citizens included in a region. 
Instead, we are dependent on last names. They suggest that legal prescriptions outlawing endogamy 
were not always followed: In a small body of inscriptions from Northern Italy (N= 312) that include 
the last names of both husbands and wives, 8% of couples bore the same last name. At the same 
time, the fact that this figures includes not just people who were married to a relative in the father’s 
line, but also those who accidentally shared a common last name (such as Julius)
19 suggests that 
high  rates  of  endogamy  would  be  unlikely  outcomes,  even  if  perhaps  not  entirely  beyond  the 
margins of the possible. It thus seems reasonable to infer that both with regard to the ideological 
and normative acceptance of endogamy, and in its actual extent of endogamous marriages Athens 
scored higher than Rome.  
 
 
3. Family ties in Athens and Rome 
 
Then what about family systems? Approaching family patterns is a difficult matter for the ancient 
world. Outside of Roman Egypt, there is only fairly indirect evidence on the way in which families 
functioned.
20 It can not tell us anything about patterns of residence, which tend to be the preferred 
focus of demographers. But it does provide indications on how much weight was put on extended 
and nuclear family ties and relationships.
21  
  Evidence on who were (supposed to be) involved in the caretaking of the dead suggests that 
Greek  city-states  with  exclusive  citizenship  attached  greater  importance  and  responsibility  to 
members beyond the next-of-kin than Romans did. Caretaking of the dead may serve as a proxy for 
family ties because Greeks and Romans believed that the souls of the deceased would find no rest if 
they  were  not  properly  buried  and  subsequently  honored  at  several  annual  funerary  rites  and 
festivals of the dead. Commemorating the dead was a moral obligation that fell onto the heirs of the 
deceased, and also explicitly a legal duty.
22 It was, in other words, a serious business and it is 
thought that the people performing these rites were close to each other in daily life.
23  
That Romans expected less of non-nuclear kin in this context than Greeks did is suggested 
by epitaphs (gravestones) and by the ways in which burial and burial rites were organized. To start 
                                                
18 See Cox (1998). It happened particularly at times when families needed support beyond their own household (e.g 
because something happened to the father). 
19 Shaw and Saller (1984), p. 437. 
20 For Roman Egypt, census data with household records have been preserved, but this is thanks to exceptionally good 
climatic conditions for preservation of perishable materials. No such data survive for other parts of the Greco-Roman 
world.  
21 Note that anthropologists have long been studying characteristics of family life by other means: for example the 
complexity and width of kinship terminologies or the average living distances between kin members to measure the 
strengths of family bonds - precisely because residence in itself does not tell the full story either. Cf. e.g. the EU 
Kinship And Social Security (KASS)-project (http://www.eth.mpg.de/kass/index.html). 
22 Saller and Shaw (1984), p. 124-128; Carroll (2006), p. 185; Meyer (1990), p. 74f. (section I). Note that in most cases 
the heir to a deceased man or woman was a member of the immediate family, but that this was not necessarily or always 
the case. We may infer the latter from Cicero, De Legibus 2.48, where he states that the performance of the rites may be 
imposed upon those to whom the property passes, so that the memory of them [i.e. the deceased] may not die out: Hoc 
posito haec iura pontificum auctoritate consecuta sunt, ut, ne morte patris familias sacrorum memoria occideret, iis 
essent ea adiuncta ad quos eiusdem morte pecunia venerit. For Greece, among others Isaios’ judicial oration on the 
legacy of Menekles makes clear that one could make legal claims on heirship on the basis of burial performance: Isaios 
2.36-37. Cf. also Closterman (2007), p. 249-250 and Meyer (1990), p. 77. 
23 Cf. Carroll (2006), p. 33: ‘the naming of the deceased in an epitaph, as well as the dedicator, be it mother, father, 
husband, wife, child, or other family members, commemorated not only the dead, but also the relationship that was 
publicly acknowledged in the inscription’.    5 
with the latter, it seems telling that, unlike in the classical Greek world, in Rome a system of burial 
associations developed in which unrelated individuals who were members of the organization took 
care of each other’s afterlife. These so-called collegia funeraria, or funeral clubs, were corporate 
associations in the private sector. If you did not want to, or could not, have your family organize 
your funeral or the subsequent commemorative rites
24, you could pay to become a member of one 
of these collegia. Collegia were vastly popular. They had about 50 to 100 members each, and men, 
women, free, freedmen, slaves, young and old mixed into it
25, and would conduct funerals, set up 
epitaphs, maintain tombs, and ensure that members would attend festivals in remembrance of the 
dead, such as the rosalia.
26 Burials were, therefore, not the exclusive domain and responsibility of 
the family, and it was widely accepted to have others take care of it. In classical Athens and other 
Greek cities the phenomenon of corporate associations in which unrelated individuals took care of 
each other’s afterlife was unknown in the classical period. They did not develop until the 3
rd and 2
nd 
centuries BCE, when democracy broke down and when, in Athens, burial associations took over the 
role of the disintegrated demes, in which fellow citizens had been linked together by hereditary 
membership and endogamy. During the classical period, people instead confided in their deme and 
family members to take care of their afterlife. In classical Athens, city laws in fact determined that 
it was the legal and moral obligation of relatives to collect and bury their dead.
27 If they failed to do 
so, the leader of the deme of which the deceased person had been a member was entitled to oblige 
‘hoi prosekontes’, ‘those who are related’ to pay for the funeral and, in addition, impose a fine.
28 
There was no limitation to the first degree of kinship in the responsibility of relatives. For all we 
can tell, the Athenian understanding of familial obligations stretched beyond that of the Romans. 
This system of strong and enforceable kin obligations may therefore explain the absence of burial 
associations in the Greek context.  
It  also  helps  understand  the  contrast  between  Roman  and  Greek  burial  inscriptions. 
Inscriptional  evidence  from  the  Roman  world  shows  that  in  the  commemoration  of  the  dead, 
nuclear  family  members  took  the  lead.
29  In  fact,  gravestones  on  which  we  can  identify  the 
commemorator(s) were overwhelmingly set up by parents, husbands, wives or children – members 
of the nuclear family constitute about 85% of the cases.
30 In combination with the presence of the 
burial associations, this suggests that family beyond the nuclear members would not be expected to 
take care of deceased relatives. Athenian gravestones, in as far as we can tell
31 also include mostly 
nuclear family members, yet in addition they put strong emphasis on citizenship and membership of 
a deme.
32 As we have seen in the above, demes were subunits of citizens within which many family 
ties existed. Gravestones, therefore, emphasize not just an individual’s membership of his or her 
                                                
24 On such rites, see e.g. Carroll (2006), p. 42. 
25 Cf. also Gordon and Reynolds (2003), p. 273. 
26 On the funerary activities of collegia, cf. Van Nijf (1997), ch. 1. 
27 Whitehead (1986), p. 137. 
28 N. F. Jones (1999), p. 266; Whitehead (1986), p. 137-138. If the demarch failed to exact the costs from those liable, 
he himself had to cover them from his personal funds: [Demosthenes] 43 (Against Makartatos) 57-58. It was only by 
the later third and second centuries BCE, when the deme system was undermined, that the burial system started to fall in 
disuse and that private (religious) associations came up to fill the void by providing for the burials of their members.  
29 Recently, criticism on the use of gravestones for reconstruction of family composition has been issued: Huebner 
(forthcoming 2010). She points out various problems with the tendency of ancient historians to consider the information 
derived from  these  gravestones as a solid proxy  for residence patterns. While I support this stance, this does not 
invalidate a comparison between commemorative patterns in various regions as such, as long as we take them to be 
indications of the intensity of family ties rather than as evidence of household structure. 
30 Saller and Shaw (1984). N= 9,957.  
31  Athenian  grave  inscriptions have  not  received  thorough study  so  far.  We can  only  rely  on  a  cursory  study  by 
Elizabeth Meyer (1993).  
32 Note that grave-rites for citizens in classical Athens could not be performed by non-citizens. See e.g. Patterson (2009) 
on ‘Care of the dead: A civic responsibility’.
  It is a misconception though that burial on an Athenian graveyard in itself 
should be evidence of citizenship: Metics were engraved on the same burial grounds, as is demonstrated by Patterson 
(2006), contra Morris. Metic graves must have been rented rather than owned though, which is an issue that deserves 
further consideration.
   6 
nuclear family, but also put stress on his or her embeddedness in the larger structure of the deme, in 
which extended family members were tied together through endogamy and hereditary membership. 
This suggests that the strongly exclusive and hereditary citizenship and endogamous practices that 
had characterized the classical period form at least part of the explanation why there was greater 
emphasis  on  extended  family  ties  in  classical  Athens.
33  At  any  rate,  traditional  functionalist 
explanations of poverty and high mortality risks are unable to account for the divergence between 




4. Political demography, or how families and states interact  
 
It  goes  without  saying  that  in  demography,  one  deals  with  complex  behaviors  driven  by  and 
resulting from a interrelated array of variables. Naturally, therefore, demographic outcomes can 
never  be fully explained by  a single factor. Ancient historians have already pointed to  several 
causes of demographic variation, such as urban-rural differences, social status, and locus specific 
disease pools. Yet when it comes to the Greco-Roman world, state organizational structures shaping 
civic life have to my knowledge not been studied at all for their impact upon demography.  
But the sub-discipline of political demography has demonstrated for other times and spaces 
that structural political factors and institutions matter when it comes to explaining demographic 
differences.
35 This suggests that the immense differences between the organizational structures of 
the Roman Empire and the Greek city-states may be a factor underlying the differences in marriage 
partner selection and kinship ties that we have observed in the above. At the very least, it urges 
consideration  of  the  interaction  between  families  and  states.  Here,  I  focus  particularly  on  the 
different ways in which Greeks and Romans defined citizenship notions, and the implications this 
had for people’s daily lives. Do the ways in which concepts of citizenship defined constraints and 
opportunities for citizens and non-citizens in, among others, economic and religious and socio-
cultural life help us understand diverging demographic behaviors? My answer is a yes, and I shall 
set out in the coming sections why I think such is the case.  
 
 
5. Greek and Roman state development 
 
While both Athens and Rome started out as tiny city-states, Rome rapidly developed into an Empire 
of  a  size  unprecedented  in  Europe.  It  did  so  by  politically  integrating  conquered  people,  thus 
expanding its territory and governance. Over the course of this process, the number of Roman 
citizens  rose  dramatically,  and  the  political  system  changed  from  Republican  to  Imperial.  By 
contrast, Athens as well as other Greek cities in the Eastern Mediterranean remained self-governing, 
competitive political entities within a system of relatively small city-states throughout the classical 
period.
36 In the classical Greek world political identity - as Hansen phrased it - was ‘focused on the 
                                                
33 Elsewhere in  the Greek world,  kin support  in commemoration also  stretched beyond the  nuclear family: Many 
inscriptions include extended kin members as commemorators. In inscriptions from cities in Asia Minor, only 58% of 
915 inscriptions mention solely nuclear family members, as compared to 85% in the Latin West. See Martin (1996). But 
these stem mostly from post-classical periods. In these cases, therefore, it is less clear that the phenomenon was linked 
to exclusive citizenship regulations.  
34 For criticism on Hopkins’ (1983) thesis that uneven demographic structures were responsible for the appearance of 
burial associations in Rome, see Van Nijf (1997), p. 32-33. Hin’s (2009) argument that ancient historians have made too 
much of the lack of marriage opportunities for migrant men adds to this. Van Nijf (1997), p. 32 also counters the idea 
that members of burial organizations were those who could not afford to pay any burial on their own.  
35 Core publications in political demography are Weiner (1971), Teitelbaum (2006), and Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001).  
36  Note  that Hansen  (2000a  and  2000b)  speaks  of  a city-state  culture  to  denote  a civilization  which  is  organized 
politically as a system of city-states. Even though hierarchical ties existed, in particular in the Peloponnesian and Delian 
League, and alliances and confederacies were a frequent phenomenon, there was no political integration comparable to 
that in the Western Mediterranean.Cf. also Scheidel (forthcoming), p. 11.   7 
city-state  itself  and  based  on  differentiation  from  other  city-states’.  Essential  characteristics  of 
Greek (and other) city-states were furthermore that they were highly institutionalized and highly 
centralized, and that the politically privileged parts of the population were so small that they in fact 
constituted face-to-face societies.
37 Furthermore, in as far as we can tell, the typical Greek polis was 
politically anchored in the ekklesia (assembly) and democratic, in the limited sense of sharing equal 
rights between male citizens. The Greek city-states therefore contrasted strongly with Rome both in 
terms of community size and in terms of political system. But with the Roman conquest of the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  Greek  political  systems  changed:  during  the  Roman  Imperial  period 
oligarchy replaced democracy, and the cities were governed by local aristocracies which filled all 
important magistracies, rather than by democratic bodies.
38    
 
 
6. Blood and soil  
 
As is well recognized by state formation studies, the attribution of citizenship rights was closely 
intertwined with the processes and dynamics of state formation.
39 Concepts of citizenship, and the 
formal  status  distinctions  accompanying  those  had  –  and  still  have  -  an  active  function  in 
maintaining the fabric of societies, and states may use preconditions to citizenship as a community 
building strategy.
40  41 Discussion over the definition and distribution of citizenship rights is, for 
example, reflected in modern migration policies
42, and can be traced back to the Greco-Roman 
world in the writing of several authors, among whom Aristotle.
43 In defining full membership of a 
state, citizenship is by nature an exclusive principle. Only citizens are full members of the state and 
have access to the full array of rights and privileges connected with it; others who reside in the 
country but do not have citizenship are excluded from these.  
Which ideas on citizenship, then, characterized Greece and Rome and how did they differ? 
Greek city-states adopted the so-called ‘exclusive’ notion of citizenship.
44 Here, citizenship was a 
hereditary privilege that was carefully guarded and distributed. It rested on a combination of what 
we know as ius sanguinis (blood-relatedness) and ius solis (territorial citizenship), taking elements 
from both. As an exclusive privilege, citizenship was not granted liberally, but the entitlement of a 
limited group of members of the community – those who complied with a number of strict criteria. 
Non-citizens were not considered to be true members of the polis. Instead, at least in official terms, 
they remained outsiders in a working relationship with the city community.
45 Citizenship had to be 
recognized at various seminal occasions and at several levels of community structure (e.g. oikos, 
phratry, deme, state
46). Across the Greek city-states, such formal identification processes took place 
at distinctive moments in the life course, and did so in various forms.
47 Descent-group rules of 
                                                
37 Hansen (2000a), p. 19. Most poleis probably had no more than ca. 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants: Hansen (2000b), p. 
156. There were perhaps some 800 of them over time in Hellas, Macedon, Thrace, and on the West coast of Asia Minor. 
38 See Hansen (2000b), p. 141 (800 city-states) and p. 149 (political transitions after Roman conquest). 
39 Champion’s (2009) article on Imperialism and citizenship in Rome and Greece forms a most recent example of this 
recognition. He argues that ‘uncovering attitudes toward citizenship is crucial to understanding imperial development’.   
40 This dynamic is well portrayed in Gardner (1993) on Roman citizenship.  
41 Cf. Sassen (2006), p. 281-286 on nationalism and citizenship.  
42 See Sassen (2006), ch. 6 on current challenges to the nature and construct of citizenship and dual nationalities. Cf. 
also Strasser et al. (2009) on the need for migrants and their families to adapt to prevailing concepts of family and 
citizenship laws in the receiving state.  
43 Aristotle, Politics Book III. Connolly (2007), Ch. 2 argues that Cicero’s De Oratore, although primarily a work on 
rhetorics, also breathes out and ‘negotiates contemporaneous shifts in thought and practice related to the granting of 
citizenship and the activities of citizens in first century Rome’ (p.116). 
44 Cf. e.g. McKechnie (1989); Vérilhac and Vial (1998); Van Bremen (2003), p. 316f; Wallace (2007), p. 165-166; 
Aristotle, Politeia III.2 and SIG
3 1015.   
45 Cf. e.g. Whitehead (1977), p. 69.  
46 See Davies (1977/1978), esp. p. 109-110. 
47 Eich (2004), Davies (1977/1978). This ‘Mitgliederüberprufung’ was a process without an end and one’s citizen status 
could be questioned and recalled at any time. Although some have, and with good reason, taken the indications in the   8 
citizenship generated and maintained continuous emphasis on the importance of status boundaries 
within a single polis. They also contributed to the self-identification of citizens with their city-state, 
which is reflected in a phenomenon that seems unique to the Greek city-state world: the territorial 
element of citizenship was expressed in a citizen’s name. It included a city-ethnic in addition to 
one’s first name and patronymic, so that a man might be named ‘Alexandros Theophileos Milesios’, 
or ‘Alexander, son of Theophiles, citizen of Milet’. Non-citizens, needless to say, lacked such a 
city-ethnic.  
The  most  fine-grained  insights  in  the  practical  implementation  of  this  principle  can  be 
reached for classical Athens (5
th and 4
th c. BCE), the city and time period for which the quality and 
depth of our evidence supersedes that of others by far. For that reason, the focus in this paper will 
be on the city of Athens. Here, citizenship was defined exclusively as far back as we can tell. From 
the mid-fifth century BCE onwards citizenship preconditions were tightened by making citizenship 
conditional upon descent from two rather than one
48 citizen parents who were in legal marriage. The 
law that established this, Perikles’ Citizenship Law, thereby virtually sealed off the citizen body.
49 
As a corollary of this policy, the privilege of citizenship was by default inaccessible to foreigners, to 
the offspring of mixed marriages
50, and to former slaves and their children. The numerical share of 
these groups in the polis was substantial: Metics (‘resident aliens’) alone formed a group perhaps a 
third in size of the citizen population.
51 The exclusion of people not born out of a legal marriage 
between two Athenians was, in other words, far from a trivial phenomenon in quantitative terms. 
Granted, the State could grant citizenship to outsiders, but this opportunity to acquire citizen status 
regardless of origin should certainly not be conceived of as a de facto neutralization of the descent-
group demographic policy. The offer of citizenship remained an exception, and there was certainly 
no intentional laissez-faire policy of letting people slip in through backdoors.
52 For someone to be 
admitted to the citizen body, the citizen assembly had to vote in favor of the foreigner.
53 Entry 
regulations became even stricter from the 380s BCE onwards, when it was decided that after such 
initial consent, the assembly had to approve of the candidate a second time at a next meeting with, 
at least in nomine, a presence of 6,000 citizens at minimum.
54 As long as the Athenian democracy 
lasted, the Athenians had recourse to the requirement that only the children of two citizens should 
become citizens. In brief, we may conclude with other ancient historians that citizenship was ‘a 
jealously guarded privilege’.
55  
The exclusive citizenship principle seems to have been upheld well into the second century 
BCE: It was not until after Rome’s conquest of the Greek world that Athenian citizenship was 
                                                                                                                                                            
legal speeches in particular as evidencing of the practical difficulties involved in distinguishing between citizens and 
non-citizens  (e.g.  Vlassopoulos  [2007],  esp.  p.  34-35),  it  is  equally  important  to  have  an  eye  for  the  fixation  on 
citizenship issues that the same evidence breathes out. 
48 Such was the case after the establishment of Kleisthenes’ reformed political system in 510 BCE. See Sinclair (1988), 
p. 3-4 and 24. 
49 The law is referred to in several literary sources as well as lawsuits in which people accused others of pretending to 
be citizens. See Demosthenes 59 (‘Against Neaira’); [Aristotle], Athenaiōn Politeia 26.4 and Plutarch, Pericles 37.3; 
and  Lysias  Against  Pankleon  (esp.  §2).  On  Perikles’  Citizenship  Laws  in  general:  see  e.g.  Sinclair  (1988),  ch.2; 
Boegehold (1994). The condition of ‘dual descent’ that characterized Athens is known for various other cities in the 
Greek world also: Delos, Milet, Rhodes, Alexandria, and Halikarnassos are known cases. 
50 Note that the offspring of a citizen father and a non-citizen mother became nothoi/-ai or ‘bastards’ whereas the 
children born out of a relationship between a non-citizen father and a citizen mother would be metics or ‘foreigners’. 
See Van Bremen (2003).  
51 For the size of the metic population, cf. Hansen (1985), p. 31-32. See also N. F. Jones (1999), p. 97.  
52 Although the latter happened, the practice was not quietly accepted: In the mid-fourth century, after suspicions of 
irregularities rose, the Athenian assembly directed that all demes should review their registers of citizens. See Sinclair 
(1988), p. 25 and Davies (1977/1978), p. 112. 
53 Note that cases in which citizenship was granted to larger groups of foreigners as a reward for their contributions to 
the Athenian democracy are also known.   
54 Osborne (1981-1983), vol. 2, p. 48 with 56-57 and vol. 4, p. 161-164, in which Osborne raises doubt on the de facto 
enforcement of such a quorum: For demographic reasons, the chances of acquiring a quorum of 6,000 citizens must 
have been slight during certain periods. 
55 Sinclair (1988), p. 26. Cf. also e.g. Davies (1977/1978); Eich (2004).    9 
redefined.
56 This is hardly a coincidence, for Roman attitudes towards citizenship were distinctively 
more liberal. Such a characterization must not lead us astray in thinking that whoever lived on 
Roman  territory was a citizen:  Slaves were by default excluded.
57 But, as one modern scholar 
recently put it, ‘it may be, in fact, that the closest the world ever came to implementing a form of 
world  citizenship  was  during  the  later  Roman  Empire’.
58  Over  the  course  of  time,  Romans 
developed  an  inclusive  notion  of  citizenship.  Citizenship  rights  were  gradually  extended  to 
neighboring  communities  in  the  early  stages  of  Rome’s  development.  This  was  not  a 
straightforward  or  uniform  process,  and  neighboring  and  recently  conquered  populations  were 
treated differently along several criteria. They were accorded distinctive positions, for example as 
cives optimo iure (citizens with voting rights), as cives sine suffragio (citizens without voting rights) 
or as Latini with the right to intermarry with and to become Roman citizens upon moving residence 
to areas controlled firmly by the Romans.
59 But the Social War of the last decades of the Republic 
put an end to formal civil inequality between freeborn Italians south of the Alps. Following this, the 
attribution of citizenship rights to people who were not originally, nor born out of, citizens of Rome 
spread beyond the Italian Peninsula. Though at times with considerable delay, the distribution of 
citizenship rights thus followed Roman expansion, ignoring ethnic criteria. Routinely, Romans took 
people on board as citizens who had not been born as such: defeated foreigners as well as the 
offspring of freed slaves in many cases received in citizenship a formal acknowledgement of full 
membership of the Roman state.
60 Finally, under the emperor Caracalla (211-217 CE) virtually all 
free residents of the Roman Empire received citizenship.
61 In the conceptual framework of the 
Romans  ‘there  was  nothing  inconsistent  in  permitting  immigrating  foreigners  from  beyond  the 
frontiers to live under the umbrella of Roman ius civile. As a result, a Frank or Visigoth could 
become  just  as  much  a  Roman  citizen  as  a  Numidian,  Sardinian,  or  Egyptian’.
62  This  Roman 
conception  of  citizenship  as  a  legal  and  social  rather  than  an  ethnic  concept  finds  prominent 
expression in for example the increasing shares of provincial senators and emperors over the course 
of Rome’s development as an Empire.
63   
The contrast between the Greek and the Roman understanding of citizenship was, in other 
words, quite marked. In the next section, we shall see how the privileges and rights connected with 
citizenship stood in inverse relation to the ease with which it could be obtained. For those who 
complied with the strict Greek preconditions to citizenship, benefits in daily life were distinct. 
Under Roman rule, where citizenship was granted far more liberally, it came with less.  
 
 
7. Insiders and outsiders: the importance of civil status  
 
Why was it more important for Greeks to protect their status as citizens than it was for Romans? 
The answer lies in extent to and ways in which juridical labels that created nominal ‘insiders’ and 
                                                
56  Davies  (1977/1978),  p.  119.  Osborne  (1983),  vol.  4,  p.  208:  In  the  second  century  BCE  ‘the  flood  gates’  of 
naturalization were opened. 
57 Slaves were considered to be objects rather than humans. This is painfully formalized in the Roman census, in which 
slaves had to be registered by their household heads under the category of ‘property’, in between farming equipment 
and clothing and jewelry. See Brunt (1987
2), p. 15. 
58 Mathisen (2006), p. 1013. 
59 Cf. Coskun (2009); detailed consideration of Roman citizenship in the Republic (and also in Imperial times) in 
Sherwin-White (1973
2). 
60 For a detailed consideration of Roman citizenship in Republican and Imperial times, see and Garnsey (1970).  
61 As formalized in the Constitutio Antoniniana. According to the only preserved literary source commenting on it, 
Caracalla’s wish to increase tax revenues by expanding the body of citizens was his primary motivation: Cassius Dio, 
Roman History 78.9. A text of the Edict - which indeed refers to the fact that from then on, everybody should pay taxes 
- is preserved on a Greek papyrus from Roman Egypt, P. Giss. 40. See for text and English translation Heichelheim 
(1941).  
62 Mathisen (2006), p. 1040. Cf. also the well-known example of Paul of Tarsus who identified himself as a Roman 
citizen and was transported from Asia Minor to Rome to receive trial: Pocock (1998), p. 37 and Van Minnen (1995). 
63 See Noy (2000), ch. 3 on attitudes towards foreigners in Rome, and p. 23-26 on citizenship among foreigners.    10 
‘outsiders’ affected ‘real’ life. Because space is constraint, I let the issue of political rights and 
privileges rest here
64, and limit my consideration to the importance of citizenship in economic and 
religious and socio-cultural life in Athens and Rome.  
  
7.1 Economics and citizenship 
Citizenship  status  defined  economic  rights  and  plights  (the  right  to  perform  certain  economic 
activities and to benefit from economic privileges, and the plight to contribute taxes) to different 
extents between Greece and Rome.  
In classical Athens, some non-citizens were privileged and assimilated economically and 
fiscally  (so-called  isoteleis).  In  most  cases,  however,  being  without  citizenship  rights  severely 
limited an individual’s options to secure economic independence.
65 Owning land or real estate in 
Attika was prohibited to non-citizens, unless they had specifically been granted the right to do so 
(‘enktesis’).
66 The latter was unusual, and only started to happen more often towards the end of the 
classical period.
67 The Athenian legal restrictions also entailed that foreigners were disqualified as 
heirs of property of any kind from Athenian citizens. In economic terms, this singled them out not 
only in a legal respect, but also from a practical point of view: It is estimated that the overwhelming 
majority  of  Athenian  citizens,  perhaps  some  85%,  did  also  in  fact  own  agricultural  land.
68 
Foreigners - both xenoi (non-resident foreigners) and metics (resident aliens) - were excluded from 
practicing free smallholding and were unable to live in houses of their own. As a result, they were 
forced to rent houses and lease land.
69 It also meant that they did not have direct access to food 
items, but would have to buy them on the market or earn them as a salary in kind, and were hence 
more vulnerable to the ups en downs of supply and demand markets. Being a smallholder was not 
the only business that non-citizens were excluded from. Citizens also had exclusive rights on the 
purchase of leases of the silver-mines, which were a major source of wealth in Athens.
70 One of the 
best opportunities for making economic gains was therefore not directly accessible to non-citizens. 
Beyond that, however, foreigners were free to do business. The background to their exclusion from 
land and real estate ownership and mining was that these resources were perceived as limited in 
nature, and therefore to be reserved to native born Athenians. There were no such limitations to 
trade, banking, and manufacture, which were highly profitable in the booming economy of Athens’ 
heydays, and it is in these economic niches that foreigners were strongly involved.
71 Metics and 
citizens  worked  side  by  side  in  these  domains,  as  can  be  inferred  from,  for  example,  the 
inscriptional accounts of the building of the Erechtheion on the Akropolis.
72 They were, at least in 
financial terms, treated indiscriminately.
73 
                                                
64 Cf. Leydet (2006), with further references.  
65 See e.g. Foxhall (2002). Cf. also Reed (2003), p. 56.  
66 See e.g. Foxhall (2002), p. 217-218; Sinclair (1988), p. 29 and Whitehead (1977), esp. p. 70-71.  
67 Fisher (2006), p. 340; Humphreys (1978), p. 141 (starting in the 4
th century BCE).  
68 Osborne (1985), p. 142. He basis this assumption on Dionysios Halikarnassos analysis of Lysias’ 34, who suggests 
that 5,000 men would be excluded from Athenian citizenship if owning land would be a precondition to it; i.e. 15% of 
some 34,000 citizens. Obviously, the estimate of 85% is but a rough inference.  
69 See e.g. Foxhall (2002).  
70 See e.g. Davies (1977/1978), p. 106. On the importance of the silver mines for the Athenian economy as a whole and 
for individual wealth, cf. Osborne (1985), ch. 6. 
71  Sinclair  (1988),  p.  29.  Previous  scholarship  inspired  by  Polyani  argued  that  even  here,  citizens  and  foreigners 
occupied different domains. Trade by foreigners would have concentrated in the harbour of Piraeus, whereas market 
exchange on the agora in Athens was shielded against alien traders and dominated by citizens. This sketch of affairs 
has, however, lost much of its appeal after severe criticism, and it is now believed that citizens and non-citizens closely 
cooperated  in  trade.  See  Von  Reden  (1995),  p.  33f.  A  probable  motivation  underlying  the  inconsistency  between 
attitudes to trade and to landownership is revealed by Xenophon, who emphasizes the financial benefits of allowing 
foreign traders to operate in Athens (i.e. expansion of imports and exports; increase of sales, rents, and customs income 
in Athens): Xenophon, Poroi 3.3-5.  
72 Erechtheion inscriptions: IG I
3 475-476 and Austin and Vidal Naquet (1977) no. 73, p. 276-282.  
73 Hansen (2000b), p. 169. His phrasing that citizens, metics, and slaves worked ‘on equal footing’ is curious at the 
least.    11 
Moving from the realm of opportunities to gain assets and making a living to “welfare” 
provisions, similar distinctions based on civil status appear. Citizens were included in - irregular -
distributions of money and free or below market-price goods by the State or by public benefactors. 
Non-citizens had no right to take part in such handouts, on the grounds that only citizens had a stake 
in the revenues of the state.
74 While through these and other means economic rights of non-citizens 
were restricted, the economic plights of resident aliens were stretched beyond those of Athenian 
citizens. They were subject to market tax if they wanted to trade, and furthermore to a special poll-
tax for metics, the so-called ‘metoikion’.
75 There was no equivalent of such a poll tax for Athenian 
citizens, who did not have to pay taxes unrelated to income or property. Overall, in Athens, the 
economic position of individuals and families with citizenship rights was clearly privileged, and 
pervaded to the level of household economics.   
Roman citizens could also enjoy economic advantages over others when it came to taxation 
and handouts, yet these privileges were not exclusively based on citizenship status. After Rome 
conquered Macedon in 167 BC, the large influx of booty made the State decide to free Roman 
citizens in Italy from their obligations to pay taxes. Within Italy, this effectively shifted the burden 
of financing Rome to non-citizens.
76 Yet at the same time, Romans in the provinces were subject to 
taxation regardless of their status as citizens
77, so that there was no overall clear-cut distinction on 
the basis of civil status with regard to tax liability. Likewise, state benefits were more often but not 
exclusively directed to citizens. The alimenta-system of the Roman emperors that in some cases fed 
both  citizen  and  non-citizen  children  provides  a  clear  example  of  this.
78  These  two  brief 
comparisons on taxation and orphan benefits show how Roman citizens did not enjoy equally clear-
cut or distinct economic privileges on the basis of their civil status as was the case in classical 
Athens. Importantly, this impression is reinforced when turning to the issue of ownership rights: 
Unlike freedmen in classical Athens, their counterparts in the Roman Empire were free to inherit, 
buy and sell land and houses.
79 The same held true for foreigners and metics, who at any rate 
formed a diminishing category as citizenship rights spread. Given the importance of assets and 
inheritance rights to marriage and patterns of household formation, this might potentially be a most 
relevant differential with regard to the question of demographic divergences.  
 
7.2 Socio-cultural citizenship  
In social, religious, and cultural life, there was no full integration between foreigners and citizens. 
Particularly in the Greek city-status, this was partly a result of the fact to that non-citizens did not 
receive equal rights and opportunities to participate in social and cultural activities on the grounds 
of their civil status. While  there were  certainly ‘free spaces’  where foreigners (and  slaves and 
women) could have social and cultural interaction with citizens, such as the agora
80, many activities 
in the socio-cultural realm were not fully, and some not at all accessible to non-citizens. From a few 
examples, we can gain a rough impression of contrasting elements in Greek and Roman attitudes on 
‘integration’ of citizens and non-citizens in daily social, cultural, and religious life.   
Both in Greek and in Roman cities, immigrants brought religions with them that became part of 
the scenery. The presence of ‘foreign’ gods brought along tensions from time to time, but there was 
                                                
74  Davies  (1977/1978),  p.  106.  Compare  Garnsey  (1988),  p.  79-80  on  the  underlying  motivation  for  limiting 
distributions to citizens, and p. 81f. on the irregularity of distributions. 
75 Sinclair (1988), p. 30; Whitehead (1977), p. 11; 16; 75-80. There is no direct evidence on the procedure for the 
payment of the metoikion. One may logically assume that payments were collected at the office where foreigners were 
registered as metics, but it is not clear whether this was at a central point, or at their local deme. See N. F. Jones (1999), 
p. 67, n.72. On the market tax for foreigners: It is believed that this tax represents a later mitigation of an original 
exclusion of foreigners from doing business at the agora.  
76 The standard work on Roman taxation is Nicolet (1976).  
77 On taxation of Roman citizens in the provinces, see Brunt (1990), p. 329f. and Neesen (1980). 
78 See e.g. the so-called Veleia inscription, CIL XI, no. 1147 (2
nd century CE) and C. P. Jones (1989).  
79 The freedman Trimalchio from Petronius’ Cena Trimalchionis needs no further introduction as the ultimate example 
from Latin literature. 
80 Cf. Vlassopoulos (2007) on the agora.   12 
no systematic exclusion of non-traditional religions.
81 Identifiable divergences pertain mostly to the 
participation of non-citizens in Greek and Roman religious cults and festivals. The Roman stance 
was governed by the idea that their own gods might be provoked in anger, with possibly detrimental 
results, if people refused to venerate them. Foreigners should therefore cultivate Roman religion in 
addition to their own in order to prevent this.
82 This preferred line of reasoning deviated from that in 
Greek  city-states,  where  religion  was  a  prominent  part  of  public  polis  life  and  the  issue  of 
citizenship weighted more heavily. Participation of metics in Athenian state cults was restricted 
because of their status as non-citizens.
83 They would, for example, automatically be barred from 
rites that belonged to phratries and genes, because these were institutions of which only citizens 
could be members. The holding of public priesthoods was also reserved to citizens.
84 Non-citizens 
did  take  part  in  a  number  of  religious  festivals  and  ceremonies,  as  is  testified  by  several 
inscriptions.
85 At the same time, it is not clear that metics took part on equal footing in these cases: 
At the Hephaistia festival, for one, metics shared the meat of three animal offers, when their citizen 
counterparts consumed the remains of one hundred victims
86 – a ratio that does not quite correspond 
to the ratio of citizens and metics in the city.
87 Like women, non-citizens participated in the margin 
of religion. 
A second node for social and cultural interaction in daily life was formed by associations (that 
often also had a religious component to them). Foreigners were only sporadically admitted to such 
associations during the heydays of the Athenian democracy.
88 As far as we can judge from the 
evidence,  admixture  of  citizens  and  non-citizens  in  associations,  be  they  religious,  social,  or 
professional, occurred only to a limited extent in classical Athens. When non-citizens were allowed 
to participate, this seems to have merited special attention as an exception to the rule, as in the deme 
of  Skambonidai,  which  expressly  mentions  their  integration  in  local  religious  celebrations.
89 
Evidence  suggesting  admixture  of  ‘old’,  ‘new’  (freedmen)  and  non-citizens  (slaves)  in  Roman 
associations, on the other hand, is widespread. There is furthermore no reason to assume that within 
these organizations, internal hierarchy would automatically place freeborn individuals in leading 
positions.
90  
  A last realm of socio-cultural life that deserves attention here is that of sports and education.  
In the Greek world, the gymnasion served as a center for sporting, (military) training and (social) 
education.  There  are  several  indications  that  legal  status  was  a  factor  that  could  be  used  to 
determine  one’s  eligibility  to  participation  in  the  activities  of  the  gymnasion.
91  Evidence  is 
particularly compelling for the ephebeia, one of the institutions that formed a central part of, and 
resided in, the gymnasion. Non-citizens were hardly ever included in the ephebeia, which provided 
social education and military training for young males.
92 Youngsters were acquainted with and 
                                                
81 Note that foreigners in Athens did need special permission to erect a shrine on Attic soil, assuring the privilege of 
enktesis (‘the right of holding property’) that was innate to Athenians. 
82 See e.g. Lane Fox (1986), p. 425- 434 with regard to monotheist Christians. 
83 Cf. e.g. Dillon (2002), p. 205 and Whitehead (1977), p. 86 on the limited participation of metics in religion. The latter 
argues that ‘any share in (religious activities) ceded to metoikoi was bound to stop very far short of equality’. 
84 Davies (1977/1978), p. 106. 
85 E.g. IG I³, 244 (Skambonidae) and IG I
3 82.  
86 IG I
3 82.23 (421/420 BCE): ‘do`nai de; [k]ai; toi`~ metoivkoi~ tre`~ bou`~’.  
87 This ratio is estimated to have been around 1:3 (see above, p. 8). 
88 N. F. Jones (1999); Fisher (2006), p. 334.  
89 IG I
3 244 (= I
2 188), lines C 6-9 Athens, ca. 460 BCE: ‘eJ[kavstoi] Skamboni[don kai]; to;~ metoivk[o~ lac]en’. 
90 CIL V 800 (Aquae Statiellae) has now been identified as dedicated by a slave or freedman who fulfilled three major 
leading functions within a funerary college, namely the aedileship, tribunate and quaestorship. See on this Gordon and 
Reynolds (2003), p. 272. CIL XIV 2112 from Lanuvia shows that slaves and freedmen were treated on an equal footing 
with citizens.  
91 The gymnasiarchal law from Beroia, for example, explicitly prohibits slaves, freedmen and their sons, and traders 
(often foreigners) to train in the gymnasion. Fines for violation amounted to 1,000 drachms (ca. 1,000 daily wages). The 
inscription is published by Gauthier and Hatzopoulos (1993). 
92 This institution was a prominent feature of Greek cities, and can be traced back in a range of cities on the Greek 
mainland (including Athens), in Macedonia, on the Greek isles, and in cities along the West coast of Asia Minor. As I   13 
prepared for  their  civic  duties,  and  it  is  in  the  light  of  the  notion  that  only  citizens  were full 
members of the city-state that we may understand how only the offspring of citizens normally 
participated  in  the  ephebeia.  How  does  this  compare  to  Rome?  There  are  no  exact  Roman 
counterparts to the gymnasion and the ephebeia, which obviously limits the viability of comparison. 
The military training function of the gymnasion was taken up by other institutions in the Roman 
world. Education was privately organized, and Romans preferred to be passive rather than active 
sportsmen.  Thermae  and  balnea,  however,  did  perform  part  of  the  functions  of  the  Greek 
gymnasion in the Roman setting: They provided a place for bathing and exercise. Widely spread 
and vastly popular, the social function they fulfilled as such in everyday life was comparable to that 
of the gymnasion.
93 As a recent study of the identities of bathers and the degree of ‘interclass 
mixing’ has pointed out, people of all statuses and backgrounds joined together for bathing and 
exercises in the thermae and balnea.
94 Approached as a proxy for integration between citizens and 
non-citizens,  the  comparison  between  the  Roman  baths  and  the  Greek  gymnasia  is  therefore 
instructive. Here too formal status shaped participation in daily life activities less pronouncedly in 
the Roman context.      
 
 
8. Living with carrots and sticks  
 
From the above, it shall be clear that in Athens, the rights and privileges connected to citizenship 
were pervasive, and that non-compliance to demographically defined preconditions to citizenship 
would  result  in  exclusion  from  many  daily  life  activities.  Non-citizens  lived  under  constraints 
resulting from their civic status as free non-citizens. They ‘suffered from legal disabilities’
95, but 
these  legal  disabilities  were  not  restricted  to  the  political  and  juridical  realm;  they  prevented 
individuals from undertaking and participating in a considerable number of daily life activities, in 
the community but also in the private sphere. In Roman Italy, the issue of citizenship mattered 
much less for two reasons. Firstly, the liberal Roman attitude on citizenship made it accessible to 
much larger shares of the total population, so that the citizen/non-citizen distinction was not as 
discernible a boundary. Secondly, the rights and privileges connected to Roman citizenship were far 
less pervasive and encompassing.
96  
The outcomes of the marriage partner selection process were so different between Roman 
and Greek men and women, that it suggested that they must have operated along different criteria. 
Taking their divergent citizenship concepts into account helps us understand why: The range of 
acceptable and desirable marriage partners was much more constrained in classical Athens than it 
was in Rome. For Athenians, there were exceptionally clear incentives to protect their lineage by 
marrying a citizen, for they had a lot to lose if they did not.
97 The tendency towards endogamy was, 
in all likelihood, supported by the pervasive reduction in opportunities for participation in social 
                                                                                                                                                            
have argued elsewhere, in most cities (with Athens as a notable exception) the ephebeia was designed with a particular 
eye to educating young men as citizens of their community, functioning as an institution for social and civic rather than 
intellectual education. Cf. Hin (2007). Inscriptional evidence shows that admission of foreigners to the ephebate was 
rare. See e.g. Davies (1977/1978), p. 119 on the ephebeia as a ‘the, or a, criterion of citizenship’. Cf. also Artemidoros, 
Oneirocritica 1.54. 
93 With the arrival of the so-called ‘monumental baths’ in the Imperial period, the public baths also gained importance 
as a cultural center. Inspired by the Hellenistic gymnasia emperors started to include more cultural facilities, such as 
libraries and lecture halls.  
94 Fagan (1999), Ch. 8. Fagan emphasizes in respond to earlier scholarship that this mixing of citizens, foreigners, 
freedmen, and slaves should not be mistaken for a mechanism of equalization. He convincingly argues that it should 
rather be understood as an institution that replicated social order and at the same time promoted a broad community 
spirit. 
95 This phrasing is preferred in Morris (1999), p. 48. 
96 That scholarship currently still debates over the question whether or not Italian communities wished to obtain Roman 
citizenship in the Social War in the first century BCE illustrates the point: It is not that clear how eager people were to 
gain and protect Roman citizenship rights. 
97 Cf. Davies (1977/1978), p. 106 ‘privileges worth defending’.    14 
and cultural life, and for making a living, that marrying a foreigner would entail for oneself or one’s 
offspring.  Citizenship  regulations,  in  other  words,  provided  strong  incentives  for  Athenians  to 
marry  amongst  each  other.  This  forms  the  key  to  understanding  the  conformity  to  normative 
preference and legislative frameworks, a convergence between behavioral norms and behavioral 
practice which at a theoretical philosophical level can legitimately be questioned but one which is 
observable in the data. In spurring such convergence, the fact that women had to be pledged (i.e. 
accepted by broader family) for a marriage to be legitimate certainly played a role.
98 Marriage was a 
family decision rather than an individual choice.
99 Under these circumstances, marriage unions tend 
to become more of a rational strategy and less of a love affair.  Athenian legislation seems almost 
tailored to move parents in the direction of endogamy by making them lose their own citizenship 
and property if they marry their child to a non-citizen.
100 It is easy to see why, taking descent group 
interests and criteria into account, Greek families would prefer their offspring to marry among 
citizens. The fact that it was sometimes difficult to determine who was of citizen descent, and who 
was not, might provide explanation also to the tendency to marry one’s children to known families, 
for example within the deme. After all, citizenship could be questioned and challenged at any time, 
and with detrimental outcomes. The emphasis on exogamy rather than endogamy among Roman 
families can be understood in the light of the absence of pervasive interests to protect citizenship 
privileges by marrying within a circle of fellow citizens. The inclusive citizenship concept prevalent 
in Roman society created no endogamous incentives.
101  
Can a similar line of reasoning also help understand why individuals would put more or less 
pervasive emphasis on extended family ties? The case of family ties is a more complex one, for 
three  reasons:  first,  the  limits  of  the  ancient  evidence  are  more  stringent  here;  second,  the 
interactions are  more  indirect, and,  third,  the  mechanisms  were  different  for  citizens  and  non-
citizens. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a (tentative) case for a relationship between citizenship 
preconditions  and  family  ties.  Tight  citizenship  preconditions,  as  we  have  seen,  affected 
opportunities  for  economic  independence  (negatively  in  the  case  of  non-citizens)  and  created 
incentives for endogamy (in the case of citizens) in the Greek case. These two factors, opportunities 
for  economic  independence  and  endogamy  rates  are  known  to  have  considerable  impact  upon 
family ties. We may, therefore, expect some indirect effect of citizenship on family ties because it 
shaped the limits of possible, feasible, acceptable and/ or rewarding demographic behavior.  
How? We can  be short  about endogamy: The presence of endogamy tends  to reinforce 
family ties because it increases the number of close, marital relationships within extended families. 
Greek  city-states  were  generally  small,  and  if  ties  were  reconfirmed  over  the  generations,  and 
networks of blood-relatives were closely knit, this would have contributed to the stronger sense of 
family cohesion between more distant relatives as we see it expressed on grave memorials. Higher 
rates  of endogamy in the Greek world  in themselves may therefore be one  reason why Greek 
families apparently stuck together more closely.  
The strength of extended family ties tends also to be affected by individuals’ opportunities 
for economic independence. When these are limited, family members play a more important role as 
a  security  network  for  survival,  particularly  in  (pre-industrial)  societies  that  lack  institutional 
support. Maintaining good relationships with extended family members, in other words, becomes 
more attractive when these family members provide an individual’s best hope to safeguard his 
existence. Opportunities for economic independence, vice versa, tend to undermine extended family 
ties. Historical demographers have often emphasized the importance of opportunities for economic 
independence, or the lack of them, in shaping family ties. Even in the ultimate expression of family 
ties,  residence,  changes  in  overall  patterns  can  be  observed  in  par  with  changing  economic 
opportunities in a range of contexts. One example is provided by the case of Hong Kong, where co-
                                                
98 See Davies (1977/1978), p. 105; 109. 
99 Note that this held true also in the context of inheritance, which was regulated by the kin group of the anchisteia.  
100 See section 2, p. 2. 
101 Needless to say, endogamous incentives could result from other factors. Especially in small communities of farmers 
owning land, there might be kin endogamy to prevent the splitting of estates.   15 
residence was widespread because people could simply not afford their own place, but started to 
drop sharply in the 1960s when the government started a massive public building program that 
provided cheap housing, allowing the rise of nuclear family units.
102 The Netherlands around WWII 
forms another exemplary case: nuclear norms were strong, but war conditions undermined both 
incomes and the construction of new building. Particularly in the most damaged and most densely 
populated areas a wave of newly weds were forced by circumstances to live in with kin, and during 
this period of housing shortage it was fairly common for multiple households to share residence. 
This situation lasted well into the 1960s, until post-war housing construction finally gained pace.
 103 
Clearly, co-residence was the result of adaptive behavior, a strategy forced by the infeasibility of 
other options.  
So how is the relationship between opportunities for economic independence and strength of 
family ties of relevance to the case of citizenship and demography in the ancient world? As is 
displayed  in  figure  1,  opportunities  for  economic  independence  are  shaped  mostly  by  three 
variables: inheritance, urbanization and migration.  
Signs: “+” for positive correlation; “-” for negative correlation
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Fig. 1 Family ties and citizenship
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There are some arguments to support the hypothesis that economic dependence was greater in the 
Greek city-states  of  our  sample  than  in  the  Roman  inscriptions,  and  that  this  may  explain  the 
divergence between the two bodies of data. First, in the Greek world there were more groups who 
were excluded from access to inherited wealth: in contrast to their counterparts in the Roman world, 
metics and freedmen could not own or inherit land or houses. These population groups were unable 
to  accumulate  capital  and  keep  houses  in  the  family.  It  put  more  economic  stress  on  each 
generation, as they had to fend for themselves without being able to rely on landed family capital. 
When it comes to housing, this meant that for individuals, access to an own housing unit was more 
difficult.  They  were  dependent  on  the  rental  market, and  on  market prices for  housing.  Labor 
opportunities were also reduced for non-citizens, primarily because they could not own a farm.
 104 
Overall, the exclusion of non-citizens from certain economic opportunities rendered them more 
                                                
102 See e.g. Lee and Ngai-ming (2006).  
103 See Van der Kroef (2004), p. 93f. In the early 1960s, around 170.000 families still were forced to share housing with 
others, upon which the lack of opportunity to establish a nuclear household was declared ‘volksvijand no.1’ (the biggest 
enemy of the people) and top priority by the central government.   
104 The distribution of metics over Attica was studied by Whitehead (1986), p. 83-4, who established that most of them 
lived in urban and suburban demes of Athens, including the Piraeus, and only very few in the inland demes, which were 
dominated by agriculture. This ties in well with the legal restrictions on property ownership.    16 
vulnerable, and more dependent upon others. Under these conditions, one would predict a greater 
reliance  on  family  networks  for  support.  Since  non-citizens  formed  a  substantial  part  of  the 
population - in Athens metics alone accounted for an estimated 1/3 of the free population - this is a 
factor to count in when analyzing the inscriptions. It may be one reason why we find a stronger 
emphasis on broader kinship networks in the Greek evidence.  
This argument, however, works only for non-citizens. The question thus arises why Greek 
citizens would also display a greater tendency towards taking care of extended relatives. One reason 
might simply be that they were expected to by the ‘metechein tes politeias’ (‘to have a share in the 
polity’) culture, which emphasized community responsibility, equality and shared responsibility 
between citizens. The moral  obligation  to take  care  of family  members that was laid down in 
Athenian burial law (see above section 3), ties in well into that. In practice, such an ideological 
culture could take shape best in communities of limited size, and was supported by the fact that 
Greek city-states remained relatively small. They were urbanized communities, but none of them 
ever reached the sheer size of the city of Rome, the city from which many of the Latin inscriptions 
come. Since ancient demographic conditions did not allow for rapid natural population growth in 
cities, urban growth was mostly the result of migration. This is relevant because it implies that 
migration was more pervasive and massive as a structural phenomenon in the case of Rome than it 
was in the case of Athens, and of other Greek cities. It is not immediately obvious why this should 
have been the case, and it may well be stretching the imagination too far to suggest a connection 
between  the  intensity  of  migration  flows  and  the  distribution  of  citizenship  rights.  Hence  the 
question-mark in figure 1. Nevertheless, citizenship rights may have been among the push- and pull 
factors that shaped migrant behaviors. At the very least, the fact that ancient Greeks claimed that 
Solon  tried  to  attract foreign  traders  and  their  families  to  Athens  by  offering  them  citizenship 
rights
105 evidences of a certain acceptance of the idea that citizenship, or lack of it, could be a 
incentive or a disincentive to migrate to a certain place or stay away from it.  
Through complex interactions, variation in citizenship rights may thus be connected with 
variation in patterns of family ties as expressed on grave inscriptions. It should be emphasized that 
other explanatory factors should be taken into consideration also, and that the epigraphic material, 
particularly that of Athens, deserves closer scrutiny than can be allowed here. Even so, migration, 
urbanization, and access to inherited wealth are strong candidates to provide an explanation to 
phenomenon of variation in family relationships. 
 
 
8. Chickens, eggs, and Todd’s family model 
 
The preceding analysis has started from the presumption that states, by way of their implementation 
of norms through institutional structures, have an indirect impact upon the demographic behaviors 
of their resident  populations. But families were there before states.  Then are states  rather than 
families and their demographic behaviors our dependent variable that requires explanation? What’s 
the chicken, and what’s the egg? Though notoriously tedious, the question deserves attention. After 
all, if differences in family structures and demographic behaviors led to the emergence of different 
types of states, this implies that the ‘effects’ of state structures on family life and demography were 
in reality but a reflection or perpetuation of norms originating in the family context that through 
bottom  up  processes  became  formalized  in  these  state  structures.  In  other  words,  they  were  a 
reflection of dynamics within the household.  
  Within  the  field  of  historical  demography,  a  study  conducted  in  association  with  the 
Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure has argued that communities 
or ‘nations’ set their own family values into ideological form, and that this led to the creation of 
political diversity.
106 Specific family values, in other words, supported specific state systems.
107 The 
                                                
105 Plutarch, Solon 24.  
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main weaknesses of this theory, however, are twofold: It presupposes that family ideologies are 
static, and that the interaction between family and state is straightforward and unidirectional, and 
without feedback loops. These are problematic assumptions. State laws and institutions as described 
above reflect more than just (family) ideologies. Generally set up with the aim to operate as a 
solution to practical issues and problems, and adapted over the course of time as a response to 
changing conditions, the characteristics of states and institutions emerge from the interaction of a 
range of factors and dynamics, of which family ideology is only one.  
  Another problem with this theory is that it links family types to government and state types 
in  a  rigid  way.  Democracies  are  thought  to  be  ‘naturally’  emerging  in  societies  with  nuclear 
families, whereas societies with extended families are thought to be unsupportive of democracies. 
Clearly, this model does not apply to the Greco-Roman world, where Greek democracies emerged 
in a setting of stronger emphasis on extended family ties, and Roman hierarchical concentration of 
power rose in the context of stronger emphasis on nuclear ties.  
 
 
9. Understanding the dynamics? Citizenship, decision making processes and political systems  
 
The state-family opposition does not bring us much further in understanding how demography and 
politics interact. A more fruitful way of looking at the problem, perhaps, is to ask why Greek and 
Roman  communities  developed  such  different  ideas  on  citizenship.  It  is,  after  all,  the  specific 
characteristics of Greek and Roman citizenship notions and their implementation in various realms 
of daily life which seem to underlie the demographic specificities observed.   
As so often, periods of change provide the best scope for gainer deeper insights. The first is 
that of the classical period, where the tightening of citizenship preconditions in Athens took place 
during the blooming period of its democracy. Another of these is the transition from the classical to 
the  Hellenistic  period,  when  in  the  Greek  world  a  gradual  breakdown  of  the  exclusivity  of 
citizenship  took  place.  Boundaries  between  citizens  and  non-citizens  started  to  fade  after  the 
inclusion  of  Greek  city-states  into  the  Hellenistic  Empires.  This  development  is  visible  in,  for 
example, the increasing inclusion of foreigners into the ephebeia.
108 Under Roman reign, in the 
Imperial  period, changing  attitudes on  citizenship in  the  Greek East invigorate.  Among others, 
euergetism  towards  non-citizens,  and  particularly  towards  slaves,  increases  which  might  reflect 
‘eine zunehmende Offenheit innerhalb der städtischen Gesellschaft’.
109 Membership of associations 
became more mixed as it was gradually extended to various ‘outsiders’ (foreigners and women) in 
Hellenistic and Roman times.
110 
These  dynamics,  processes  in  which  political  change  and  changing  citizenship  notions 
coincided,  point  to  the  relevance  of  power  dynamics  in  the  implementation  of  norms  through 
institutions. Within the egalitarian ideology of the democratic Greek city-states, the decision over 
who  should  be  allowed  to  be  a  citizen  was  left  to  the  group  of  citizens  and  took  place  in  a 
democratic procedure. The structural organization of the decision-making process on the attribution 
citizenship  thus  facilitated  selection  of  those  individuals  who  were  considered  to  have  been 
beneficial to the group as a whole on the grounds of their (potential or perceived) contribution to the 
community. Importantly also, the decision to share citizenship rights would need to made by a 
majority decision of the people who would, as a consequence, need to share their privileges with 
these  new groups. Within the Roman political  system, as well as within the more hierarchical 
political structures prevalent in the Hellenistic period, political outcomes were rather the result of 
elite power twists. Arguably, these systems left more scope for individuals ‘on top’ to implement 
citizenship  regulations  that  fitted  their  political  interests  well,  without  having  to  be  directly 
                                                                                                                                                            
107 As Page Moch (1986) emphasizes in a review of Todd (1985), his book is very much a product of Cold War Era 
thinking. It has not found much support among historical demographers. 
108 See e.g. Strubbe (2001), p. 30.  
109 Strubbe (2001), p. 33. 
110 See N. F. Jones (1999) and Fisher (2006). For the contrast with the classical period, see section 6.2.    18 
concerned about losing their own privileged position by sharing citizenship rights. Political power 
was  not  independent  of  citizenship  rights  in  these  contexts,  because  fulfilling  high  political 
functions was open only to those with citizenship rights. But additional preconditions to political 
power, namely economic, social and ‘familial’ distinction, largely protected the men who were in 
the position to decide over citizenship rights and privileges from such threats. There was no need 
for Roman or Hellenistic elite men and emperors to worry about undermining their position by 
extending citizenship. If we may believe the accusations of some contemporaneous observers, they 
expanded  the  body  of  citizens  precisely  because  they  thought  they  could  gain  from  doing  so. 
Caracalla is most explicitly accused of having been guided by the motive.
111 He is said to have 
given all free men in the Empire citizenship rights so that he could increase tax revenues. But nor 
are others are free from accusations of the kind that they tried to get more people on the census list 
of officially enumerated and counted capita civium (heads of citizens) for their own benefit.
112 
From this point of view, it is unsurprising that we find a liberal, inclusive concept of citizenship in 
the Roman Empire, and an exclusivist understanding of it prevailing in the Greek city-states: They 





Ancient  demography  deserves  a  comparative  approach,  and  Greco-Roman  patterns  need  to  be 
considered from a wider perspective, taking  into  account the (socio-)political context  in which 
human behavior occurred. If we should draw two inferences from the preceding analysis, this is 
what they are.  
Our  analysis  has  focused  on  the  relevance  of  a  single  aspect  of  political  organization 
systems,  the  ‘politics  of  citizenship’,  or  the  policies  and  institutions  that  organized  society  in 
compliance  with  ideas  on  citizenship.  These  had  unintended  or  indirect  side-effects:  They 
established,  shaped,  and  altered  constraints  to  and  (dis)incentives  for  certain  demographic 
behaviors. When it came to marriage and family patterns, some options were rendered more or less 
feasible, acceptable, advantageous or desirable in terms of their social and economic consequences.  
As  we  have  seen  in  the  above,  indications  for  differentiation  in  Greek  and  Roman 
demographic behavior may be understood in the light of such diverging incentives. The Greek 
socio-political setting and exclusive understanding of citizenship promoted endogamous marriage, 
and  created  dependence  among  larger  groups  of  people.  These  conditions  may,  in  line  with 
demographic theory, explain why Greek families put greater emphasis on extended family ties in 
grave  inscriptions  than  Romans  did:  Interpersonal  relationships  gained  importance  through 
structural conditions. Conversely, the Roman liberal and inclusive view on citizenship was more 
conducive to exogamy - marriage outside one’s own group. The greater emphasis on nuclear family 
ties might also be understood as indirectly related to citizenship rights, to the extent that there were 
no  legal  or  administrative  obstacles  which  structurally  undermined  the  opportunities  towards 
economic independence of specific groups of people. There were no institutional cadres that created 
and sustained a need for individuals to find a living in certain economic realms, and prevented them 
from ownership of land and houses.
113  
By  adopting  a  ‘political  demography’  perspective,  we  gain  an  eye  for  the  impact  of 
structural factors beyond the economic and the ecologic upon the demographic lives of individuals. 
                                                
111 For Caracalla, cf. Cassius Dio, Roman History 78.9. See also above, section 5. 
112 The Gracchi did not expand the number of citizens per se, but they expanded the number of citizens eligible to rights 
and plights depended upon assets. Traditionally, their land redistribution in the Roman Republic is thought to have been 
motivated by the interest they (or the Republic?) had in getting more people on the list of citizens with enough money. 
See e.g. Mouritsen (2008), p. 478.  On Augustus, possible tax motives, and the Roman census, see Hin (2008).  
113 Along  the  same  lines,  phenomena  like adoption,  migration, and  inheritance  patterns  which  could receive  only 
minimal attention here deserve further attention.  
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Their behaviors were embedded in a framework of rules on citizenship, and the economic, social, 
and cultural (dis)advantages attached to those. A ‘political demography’ perspective might easily be 
regarded as a structural or institutional approach to historical phenomena, and, by implication, to 
markdown agency. Yet, obviously, binominal models do not work well for complex behaviors. The 
value  of  pointing  to  the  importance  of  citizenship  rules,  then,  lies  in  its  contribution  to 
understanding  the  dynamics,  not  in  replacing  other  explanations  to  demographic  divergence. 
Structural conditions emerging from the political, in other words, played their role in a web of 
interrelated factors. As such, political demography deserves a greater place in (ancient) historical 
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